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DEATH RESULTING SOLELY FROM MENTAL AND
EMOTIONAL STRAIN HELD A COMPENSABLE
INJURY UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW
Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc.
10 N.Y2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961)
Plaintiff's husband, a director of maintenance, died from a heart attack
while investigating the repair work on one of his employer's airplanes.
Decedent had been worried because he was blamed for the corroded con-
dition of the plane by his employer, and also had been greatly disturbed
with the repair bill of $266,000.1 After receiving the bill, he had worked
for three days trying to reduce the amount. Plaintiff received death benefits
from the Workmen's Compensation Board. The appellate court reversed
and dismissed the claim, holding that in the absence of a showing of any
physical strain a compensable industrial accident can not be established. 2
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and reinstated the award
stating that a heart attack caused solely from mental strain and tension
was compensable. 3
Prior to this case the New York courts have allowed claims where no
physical impact was involved. Compensation was paid for physical injuries
resulting from fright, mental, and nervous shock 4  Recovery has been
allowed for a heart attack caused by overexertion and arduous work5 and
for a heart attack caused by the pressure and strain of extraordinary work.6
Another award was upheld when decedent, called as a witness in his em-
ployer's behalf, became nervous and suffered mental stress which caused a
heart attack that resulted in death.7 Compensation was also allowed when
decedent suffered from shock after witnessing a fight between two employees
of a hotel.8 These cases indicate the New York courts have allowed recovery
where the injury was caused by physical effort or emotional shock resulting
1 Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219
N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961). At a party the employer made an issue of decedent's negligence in
the presence of a number of people and decedent became quite upset. While at the re-
pair firm, decedent had written his wife and stated in the letter that his employer was
going to "blow his stack" because of the high bill. The chief pilot also testified that
decedent was "very white" when "hit with the bill."
2 Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d
72 (1960).
3 Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., supra note 1.
4 Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926); See also Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
5 Furtardo v. American Export Airlines, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1948),
notion for leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 933, 83 N.E.2d 866 (1949).
6 Anderson v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 275 App. Div. 1010, 91 N.Y.S.2d
710 (1949), motion for leave to appeal denied, 300 N.Y. 759, 90 N.E.2d 901 (1950).
7 Church v. County of Westchester, 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938).
8 Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1951).
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from particular upsetting experiences. The principal case extends the scope
of the New York law in that this injury, caused solely by the worry of
employment and without physical exertion or emotional shock, was held
compensable.
A New York court in Lesnik v. Natimal Carloading Corp., a case
similar to Klimas, stated, "To affirm this award we must be ready to hold
that if a man increases the tension of his administrative work and later
suffers a heart attack while at rest, this is a compensable accident. We are
not ready to go that far in the case before us."" The court of appeals
noted the substantial proof in Klimas contrasted with the uncertain medical
proof in Lesnik. Both the appellate division and the court of appeals dis-
tinguish Lesnik from the present case because the decedent in Klimas was
in the midst of the problem which caused the attack, and the claimant was
at rest in Lesnik. It would seem inconsistent, though, to award benefits to
a worker who has an attack while at work, and then deny recovery when
the attack occurred while at rest if both attacks are shown to result from
the same cause and the proof in both cases is conclusive.
The dissenters in Klimas attack the holding by asserting that the court
is stretching the Workmen's Compensation Act to cover what is essentially
the result of the customary stress and strain of life. Another argument set
forth by the dissent is that if an award is made for injuries resulting from
nervous strains, it will make workmen's compensation the equivalent of
life and health insurance.'0 However, a causal relationship must be estab-
lished, and with modem medical techniques, there is no longer an excuse
to deny recovery on grounds of evidentiary difficulties."1 Other jurisdictions
have made awards for mental stimulus causing physical injury.12
In Ohio, the question whether worry and anxiety alone constitute an
injury which is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
9 Lesnik v. National Carloading Corp., 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1955),
aff'd 309 N.Y. 958, 132 N.E.2d 326 (1956). Claimant was an executive who for five
months had been under great tension in attempting to build up the company revenues
which had fallen off and of which he was in charge. The heart attack occurred while
claimant was entertaining customers at the race track.
10 Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 12 N.E.2d 311 (1938); Davis v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 Ohio St. 482, 484, 155 N.E.2d 889, 890 (concurring
opinion) (1959).
11 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 42.21 (Supp. 1960, at 221).
12 Insurance Dept. of Mississippi v. Dinsome, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691 (1958).
Majority stated that it seems unthinkable that, if hypertension may be aggravated either
by physical or mental and emotional exertion, courts should be willing to accept the
physical as causative, but reject as not accidental, a disability proximately resulting from
mental and emotional exertion. Dissent stated that it is stretching the act beyond
bounds to say that emotional traits or mental attitudes towards one's employment acting
on the physical body is an injury arising out of the employment; Fireman's Fund
Indem. Co. v. I.A.C., 241 P.2d 299, aff'd 250 P.2d 148 (Cal. App. 1952); Miller v.
Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957); Eagan's Case, 116 N.E.2d 844
(Mass. 1954); Reynolds v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transp., 21 NJ. Super. 528,
91 A.2d 435 (1952); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1958).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
before the Ohio Supreme Court in Toth v. The Standard Oil Co.13 Plaintiff
was subjected to investigation by police on suspicion that a truck driven
by plaintiff had injured a pedestrian. Plaintiff subsequently suffered
partial paralysis from a cerebral hemorrhage claimed to be caused by
anxiety and worry as a result of the investigation. The Ohio Supreme
Court disallowed the award stating: "The connection with his employment
was remote, but, even if it had been immediate, worry and anxiety does
not under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act constitute an injury."' 4
The court held that "injury" as used in the act contemplates physical or
traumatic damage or harm accidental in character. This judicial limitation
seemed to be based on the definition of the word "injury" in the statute
which at the time of the Toth case included "any injury received in the
course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment."'15 Thus,
the Ohio courts require a physical exertion before they will consider an
injury compensable,' 6 and have refused to extend the law to include non-
physical factors like the New York courts and other jurisdictions.17
The interpretation of the word "injury" in the Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Act has not been consistent. 8 Because of the confusion, the
1959 General Assembly amended the definition as follows:
Injury includes any injury, whether caused by- external accidental
means or accidental in character and result, received in the course
of, arising out of, the injured employee's employment.' 9
'3 Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953).
14 Supra note 13. Dissent stated that a cerebral hemorrhage with its attendant
disabilities induced by worry and excitement over an unusual incident connected with
and growing out of an employee's work constitute an injury within the meaning and
intent of the statute.
15 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.01(c) (1953).
16 McNees v. Cincinnati Ry., 80 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio C.P. 1948), aff'd 84 Ohio App.
499, 87 N.E.2d 819 (1949), rev'd and renuanded 152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1950),
90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951). An award was finally made to plaintiff when
decedent, a bus driver, suffered a coronary thrombosis and died from severe strain of
operating his bus. The appellate court concluded that it was prejudicial to the right of
the plaintiff in charging the jury that mere mental strain or worry is not an injury
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Indeed, this decision is
hard to reconcile with Toth.
17 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 42.21 (1952); 58 Am. Jur. Work-
men's Compensation § 255 (1948).
18 In Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942),
the court held that injury should include accidental injuries not only in cause and
character but also in result. In Dripps v. Industrial Commission, 165 Ohio St. 407,
135 NE.2d 873 (1956), the court held that injury comprehends a physical or traumatic
damage or harm accidental in character and as a result of external and accidental means
in the sense of being a sudden, unexpected chance mishap, and that effort and strain
of a workman by themselves were not sufficient. This decision in effect overruled
Malone and two concurring judges urged this. Two dissenting judges urged that the
term injury embraces injuries accidental in character and result as well as those pro-
duced or caused by accidental means. See Davis v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
1962]
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As a result of this amendment unusual mental stress and strain should
become recognized as an important factor.2 0 The Workmen's Compensation
Act, in view of its remedial character, is to be construed to favor the
injured workmen.2 ' Certainly excessive mental strain resulting from the
employment experience can be just as harmful to an employee as a physical
injury and should be justly compensated. It is submitted that the Ohio
courts should now follow the principal case and grant relief for an injury
caused by nonphysical factors.
168 Ohio St. 482, 155 N.E.2d 889 (1959); Toth v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 13;
Maynard v. Goodrich Tire & Rubber Co., 144 Ohio St. 22, 56 N.E.2d 195 (1944);
Workmen's Compensation in Ohio, 19 Ohio St. L.. 537, 554 (1958); Survey of 1959
Ohio Legislation, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 570, 601 (1959).
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.01(c) (1959).
20 Survey of 1959 Ohio Legislation, supra note 18.
21 Bowling Green v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Ohio St. 23, 60 N.E.2d 479 (1945);
42 Ohio Jur. Workmen's Compensation § 5 (1936).
